

**ANALYSIS OF THE DOSES ASSOCIATED WITH THE  
SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS FROM THE FRENCH NPPs:  
ARE THEY ALARA?**

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3rd ISOE EUROPEAN WORKSHOP on OCCUPATIONAL EXPOSURE MANAGEMENT AT NPPs  
Portoroz, Slovenia, 17-19 April 2002

## **INTRODUCTION**

### **□ Spent fuel shipments from French NPPs to La Hague**

- Require significant efforts to prevent/eliminate non-fixed contamination on flask surface during their preparation (loading, drying and cleaning),
- Workers involved receive individual annual doses that may be significantly higher than average,
- Reinforced procedure of contamination monitoring introduced since 1988.

### **□ French utility Electricité de France (EDF) initiated several studies with CEPN**

- **A statistical study (1999-2000)**  
Analysed the dosimetric results of the survey of 100 shipments to La Hague
- **Two extensive measurement campaigns (1999-2000)**  
Evaluated the duration and dose-rates associated with each elementary operation involved in the preparation and monitoring of a cask before shipment

## OBJECTIVES OF THESE STUDIES

- ❑ **To gain a better knowledge on:**
  - the distribution of gamma and neutron collective doses received during the cask preparation and contamination monitoring operations,
  - the influence on these doses of the reactor model (900/1300 MWe), fuel type (UO<sub>2</sub>/MOX) and thermal residual power of the assemblies.
- ❑ **To determine the relative contributions to the collective dose of the main operations, irradiation sources and workplaces:**
  - with a specific focus on operations associated with the prevention, elimination and monitoring of the contamination
- ❑ **To identify a set of radiological protection options and past experience analysis**
  - in order to reduce ALARA the collective dose associated with the preparation and monitoring of spent fuel casks before shipment from NPPs

## DOSIMETRIC STAKES OF THE SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS (1)

### Collective dose

❑ **Annual expected collective dose (200 shipments per year)**

		Collective dose (man.Sv/y)
Preparation	gamma	0.8
	neutron	0.2
	Total	1.0
Monitoring	gamma	0.1
	neutron	0.2
	Total	0.3
Total		1.3

❑ **Not negligible for it corresponds broadly to:**

- the annual collective dose (operation and maintenance) of one average French reactor,
- a little less than 2% of the collective dose (operation and maintenance) of all French reactors

## DOSIMETRIC STAKES OF THE SPENT FUEL SHIPMENTS (2)


### Individual dose

- **Contribution of the spent fuel shipments to the annual individual dose of Chinon B operators**
  - **Preparation**  
almost the half part (2.5 mSv/y out of 5.7 mSv/y, i.e. 44%)  
of the General Services operators\* annual individual dose  
that are the highest exposed group
  - **Monitoring**  
only a small fraction (0.5 mSv/y out of 3 mSv/y, i.e. 16%)  
of the Radiation Protection Department operators\*\* annual  
individual dose

\* operators involved at least one in a year in the preparation of a spent fuel shipment

\*\* operators involved at least one in a year in the monitoring of a spent fuel shipment


## DISTRIBUTION OF THE COLLECTIVE DOSE PER SHIPMENT (1)



- ❑ Important variability of the collective dosimetry associated with preparation and monitoring operations → to be explained

## DISTRIBUTION OF THE COLLECTIVE DOSE PER SHIPMENT (2)


- Significant influence of the shipment characteristics:  
reactor model (900/1300 MWe), loading type (dry/wet), fuel type (UO<sub>2</sub>/MOX)



"UO<sub>2</sub>" shipment: 12 UO<sub>2</sub> assemblies ; "MOX" shipment: 4 MOX assemblies surrounded by 8 UO<sub>2</sub> assemblies

## DISTRIBUTION OF THE COLLECTIVE DOSE PER SHIPMENT (3)

- ❑ Significant influence of residual thermal power on collective dose:



- Most often for neutron (6 out of 8) than for gamma radiation (2 out of 8)  
→ Influence of gamma radiation external to the cask
- Limited influence ( $R^2 < 0.53$ )  
→ Influence of other sources of variability: site effect, mishaps occurrence...



## FINAL RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL STUDY (1)

### □ Expected values of the collective dose by shipment type

(reactor model 900/1300 MWe, loading type (dry/wet), fuel type (UO<sub>2</sub>/MOX), thermal residual power range)

=> Derivation of dosimetric objectives depending on the shipment characteristics


### □ Limits of the 60% statistical "tolerance intervals" for the collective dose by shipment type (expected to contain 60% of the collective dose values)

=> Identification and study of shipments that present dosimetric results significantly distant from other shipments of the same type and look for:

- **good practices** within the most efficient shipments from the dosimetric point of view
- **operation mishaps** within the least efficient shipments

## FINAL RESULTS OF THE STATISTICAL STUDY (2)

- Limits of the 60% statistical "tolerance intervals" for the neutron collective dose per shipment (900 MWe reactor, UO<sub>2</sub> fuel, monitoring)




## **SHIPMENT PREPARATION (900 MWe, General Services): Main steps**

- ❑ **Tools transfer**  
Transfer/decontamination of control module, hoses, tools
- ❑ **Package reception**  
Monitoring against contamination, Package preparation  
Adhesives and cover fitting
- ❑ **Loading**  
Loading, monitoring
- ❑ **Preparation before shipment**  
Cover and adhesives unfitting  
Emptying, draining, drying  
Tightness monitoring  
Decontamination
- ❑ **Monitoring at railway terminal**

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## **TOOLS TRANSFER**



**Control module, hoses, tools**

**EDF**


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## PACKAGE RECEPTION (1)



Adhesives fitting (before loading)

## PACKAGE RECEPTION (2)



Cover fitting (before loading)


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## **PACKAGE LOADING**



**Handling**

**EDF**


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
## PREPARATION BEFORE SHIPMENT (1)



Cover unfitting (after loading)



## PREPARATION BEFORE SHIPMENT (2)



Adhesives unfitting (after loading)


## PREPARATION BEFORE SHIPMENT (3)




Adhesives fitting (before transport)




## PREPARATION BEFORE SHIPMENT (4)



Tool A



Tool B



Tool B, liquid/vapour separator

**Emptying, draining, drying**



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## PREPARATION BEFORE SHIPMENT (5)



**Tightness monitoring**

— EDF —

## SHIPMENT PREPARATION (900 MWe, General Services): Main steps

- ❑ **Tools transfer**  
Transfer/decontamination of control module, hoses, tools
- ❑ **Package reception**  
Monitoring against contamination, Package preparation  
Adhesives and cover fitting
- ❑ **Loading**  
Loading, monitoring
- ❑ **Preparation before shipment**  
Cover and adhesives unfitting  
Emptying, draining, drying  
Tightness monitoring  
Decontamination
- ❑ **Monitoring at railway terminal**



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## DECONTAMINATION



Front part



Rear part

Decontamination

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## SHIPMENT PREPARATION (900 MWe, General Services): Main steps

- ❑ **Tools transfer**  
Transfer/decontamination of control module, hoses, tools
- ❑ **Package reception**  
Monitoring against contamination, Package preparation  
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Cover and adhesives unfitting  
Emptying, draining, drying  
Tightness monitoring  
Decontamination
- ❑ **Monitoring at railway terminal**



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## TOOLS TRANSFER



Handling

EDF

## SHIPMENT PREPARATION (900 MWe, General Services): Contribution of steps to collective dose

Operation	Duration		Dose %	Average dose rate ( $\mu$ Sv/h)		
	(h)	%		Gamma	Neutron	Gamma + Neutrons
<i>Tools transfer</i>	25.0	16%	2%	2	0	2
<i>Package reception</i>	30.9	20%	6%	7	0	7
<i>Loading</i>	26.9	17%	7%	8	0	8
<b>Preparation before shipment</b> - Cover and adhesives unfitting - Emptying, draining, drying, - Leak tightness monitoring	68.6	44%	74%	19	15	34
<b>Decontamination</b>	4.5	3%	11%	34	44	78
<i>Monitoring at railway terminal</i>	0.2	0.1%	0.0%	0	0	0
<i>Others</i>	0.4	0.2%	0.1%	3	2	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>156.4</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>12</b>	<b>8</b>	<b>20</b>

## SHIPMENT PREPARATION (900 MWe, UO<sub>2</sub>, General Services) Contribution to collective dose of main operations

Operation	Duration		Dose	Average dose rate (μSv/h)			Main sub-operations / <b>sources</b>
	(h)	%	%				
			Gamma + neutrons	Gamma	Neutron	Gamma + neutrons	
<b>Prevention &amp; elimination of contamination</b>							
Decontamination	4.5	3%	<b>11%</b>	<b>34</b>	<b>44</b>	<b>78</b>	After cavity emptying (90%)
Adhesives fitting/unfitting	2.3	1%	<b>10%</b>	55	<b>80</b>	<b>135</b>	Transport adhesives fitting (90%)
Cover fitting, rinsing, unfitting	9.2	6%	<b>8%</b>	16	10	26	Cover unfitting (80%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>16.0</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>29</b>	<b>56</b>	
<b>Package preparation</b>							
Leak tightness monitoring	10.0	6%	<b>14%</b>	27	18	45	<b>Draining tool (33%)</b>
Skirt emptying/removal	1.7	1%	<b>8%</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>62</b>	<b>141</b>	<b>Separator (43%)</b>
Cavity draining/drying	1.9	1%	<b>6%</b>	<b>70</b>	26	<b>96</b>	<b>Separator/draining tool (73%)</b>
Waiting/forms filling	31.2	<b>20%</b>	<b>6%</b>	3	3	6	Desk (82%)
<b>Total</b>	<b>44.8</b>	<b>29%</b>	<b>34%</b>	<b>14</b>	<b>10</b>	<b>24</b>	
<b>Total</b>	<b>60.8</b>	<b>39%</b>	<b>63%</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>15</b>	<b>32</b>	

**SHIPMENT PREPARATION (900 MWe, UO<sub>2</sub>, General Services)**  
**Proposed protection actions**

<b>Protection action</b>	<b>Dosimetric saving collective dose %</b>
<b>Liquid/vapour separator shielding</b>	<b>&lt; 11%</b>
<b>Elimination of special adhesives (before/after transport)</b>	<b>10%</b>
<b>Decontamination operations with full cavity</b>	<b>&lt; 7%</b>
<b>Desk protected from radiation</b>	<b>5%</b>
<b>Remote display devices in protected desk</b>	<b>2%</b>
Well suited special adhesives (before transport)	5%*
<b>Removal of the liquid/vapour separator from the draining orifice</b>	<b>4%</b>
Forms filling outside the fuel building	3%*
Early exit of operators at the end of operation	2.5%*
Remote monitoring/emptying of the liquid/vapour separator	1%*
<b>Systematic decontamination of the immersion tool</b>	<b>&lt; 0.5%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>&lt; 39.5%</b>

\* Actions not considered in the sum

## MONITORING AGAINST CONTAMINATION (900 MWe, UO<sub>2</sub>#, Radiation Protection Department) Contribution of monitoring steps to collective dose

- Total of 221 screening tests + 221 300 cm<sup>2</sup> smear tests
- Plus double monitoring by an independent organisation

Monitoring step	Duration		Dose %	Average dose rate (μSv/h)		
	(h)	%		Gamma	Neutron	Gamma + Neutrons
Fuel building	12	58%	53%	17	34	50
Lorry*	5	25%	25%	13	45	58
Railway wagon	4	17%	22%	20	42	62
<b>Total</b>	<b>21</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>55</b>

\* NPP not directly connected to the railway network

# 10 UO<sub>2</sub> / 2 MOX

## MONITORING AGAINST CONTAMINATION (900 MWe, UO2#, Radiation Protection Department) Contribution to collective dose of operations

Operation	Duration		Dose %	Average dose rate (μSv/h)		
	(h)	%		Gamma	Neutron	Gamma + Neutrons
<b>Monitoring against contamination</b>						
- Rear part	1.89	9%	30%	39	140	179
- Front part	2.55	12%	29%	24	105	129
- Waiting/circulation	13.12	63%	21%	9	9	18
- Fins zone	0.70	3%	7%	51	63	114
- Lorry and wagon	0.95	5%	4%	21	24	45
- Smear test handling	0.61	3%	0%		3	3
<b>Total</b>	<b>19.9</b>	<b>96%</b>	<b>90%</b>	<b>16</b>	<b>36</b>	<b>52</b>
<b>Other operations</b>						
Regulatory dose rate measurements	0.55	3%	7%	40	96	136
Seals affixing	0.33	2%	3%	18	84	106
<b>Total</b>	<b>0.88</b>	<b>4%</b>	<b>10%</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>92</b>	<b>125</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>20.7</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>17</b>	<b>38</b>	<b>55</b>



## MONITORING AGAINST CONTAMINATION (900 MWe, UO2#, Radiation Protection Department)

### Relation monitoring-dose / detected-contamination by monitoring zone

Monitoring zone		Gamma + Neutron Dose % <b>A</b>	Relative probability of residual contamination (Valognes, 1997) <b>B</b>	Monitoring interest index <b>B / A</b>
Trunnions + trunnion bases	Front	7%	27%	3.9
Vertical and oblique parts	Front	11%	26%	2.4
Trunnions + trunnion bases	Rear	4%	8%	2.0
Skirt side and seal face	Front	15%	19%	1.3
<b>Total</b>		<b>36%</b>	<b>80%</b>	<b>2.2</b>
Vertical and oblique parts	Rear	23%	16%	0.7
Skirt side and seal face	Rear	11%	4%	0.4
Shock absorber	Front	2%	0,5%	0.3
<b>Total</b>		<b>36%</b>	<b>20%</b>	<b>0.6</b>
Horizontal part	Rear	4%	-	-
Shock absorber	Rear	5%	0%	-
Horizontal part	Front	8%	-	-
Fins zone		11%	-	-
<b>Total</b>		<b>28%</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0</b>

# 10 UO2 / 2 MOX

**MONITORING AGAINST CONTAMINATION**  
**(900 MWe, UO2#, Radiation Protection Department)**  
**Proposed protection actions**

Protection action	Dosimetric saving Collective dose %
Reduction of waiting time/removal from cask	10.5%
Discontinuation of double monitoring for zones with no detected contamination in 1997	
- Fins zone	5.5%
- Horizontal parts	4%
- Shock absorbers	1%
<b>Total</b>	<b>10.5%</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>21%</b>

# 10 UO2 / 2 MOX

## CONCLUSIONS (1)

- ❑ **Significant collective and individual doses associated with preparation and monitoring of spent fuel shipments from French NPPs to La Hague:**
  - **1.3 men.Sv/y** (annual operation & maintenance collective dose of one reactor)
  - Preparation of the casks represents **almost the half part of the annual individual dose (6 mSv/y) of General services workers**
- ❑ **Important influence on the collective dose of the shipment characteristics**
  - Reactor model (900/1300 MWe), loading type (dry/wet), fuel type (UO<sub>2</sub>/MOX), residual thermal power
- ❑ **Significant contribution to the collective dose of operations associated with the prevention, elimination and monitoring of contamination**
  - **29%** of **preparation** dose, **90%** of **monitoring** dose, i.e. **42%** of total dose

## CONCLUSIONS (2)

- ❑ **Significant but limited potential dosimetric savings of identified protection actions:**
  - **40%** of **preparation** dose, **21%** of **monitoring** dose  
 (31% of total dose) + (4% of total dose) = **35% of total dose**
- ❑ **Other protection actions could be envisaged:**
  - Choice of best protection method to protect cask surface against pond water,
  - Minimisation of operation mishaps and contamination events during preparation,
  - Optimisation of monitoring procedure in terms of number & location of smear tests (**minimum collective dose for the same level of residual contamination risk**)
- ❑ **The implementation of such actions would require the organisation of a suitable past experience collection and analysis**

## CONCLUSIONS (3)

- **The above-described studies have demonstrated the feasibility and the interest of:**
  - **Extensive analytical studies of dosimetry**  
(on a task per task basis)  
→ **to identify the most potentially effective protection actions**
  - **Detailed statistical analysis of dosimetry**  
→ **for the definition of dosimetric objectives**  
(on the basis of average expected values)  
  
→ **for the optimisation of the past experience collection**  
(with the help of statistical "tolerance intervals")  
**to identify good practices and operation mishaps**
- **The results of these studies are expected to help keeping as low as reasonably achievable (ALARA) the doses associated with the spent fuel shipments from the French NPPs**