

# Lessons Learned from Fukushima

2012 ISOE Asian ALARA Symposium  
Tokyo

September 24, 2012

IAEA, OECD/NEA ISOE Committee 7th Chairman  
EG on Severe Accident Management (SAM)  
Chairman

Wataru MIZUMACHI

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# 1. North East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami

# 4th Largest Earthquake in the World

At 14.46 **Magnitude 9.0** Earthquake

14.51 Largest Tsunami (**39.8m height**)


**133 feet** high : ten story building

So far , **~20 thousands people** were killed.

**~300 billion US Dollar** damage is estimated.

**No one** has been killed by the radiation at Fukushima

# Isolation Condenser




**Passive and Simple Core Cooling System  
by Natural Circulation**

## **2. Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS Accident**



# 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake

- Occurred 14:46 March 11, 2011
- Magnitude: 9.0 Mw
- Epicenter location: 38° 10''N and 142° 86''E, and 23.7km in depth



Seismic Intensity 4 5- 5+ 6- 6+ 7 (JMA 1st Rep.)

Reference: JMA Release [Online]. <http://www.jma.go.jp/jma/index.html>  
Partially modified by JNES.



Source: Fire and Disaster Management Agency

- East coast of northern area in the main island of Japan is seriously damaged
- As of August 11, 15,810 people are dead and 4,613 people are missing according to the Fire and Disaster Management Agency

# Onagawa NPS was safe

- Unit-1 is 524 MW BWR, Unit-2 and 3 are 825 MW BWR
- One civil engineer insisted the ground level of Reactor Building should be above 14m from Pacific Ocean considering the past Jorgan Tsunami.
- Onagawa people are mainly fishermen.  
Hundreds of them were killed by Tsunami.
- 360 fishermen climbed up to Onagawa NPS to escape from Tsunami. The Site manager accepted them to the sport gym next to R/B where they stayed 3 months supported by the emergency foods and so on.
- JSME will give the awards to him on Nov 2 this year.



# List of earthquakes in Japan

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is a **list of earthquakes in Japan** with a magnitude of 7.0 or above or which caused significant damage or casualties. As indicated below, magnitude is measured on the Richter magnitude scale ( $M_L$ ) or the moment magnitude scale ( $M_w$ ), or the surface wave magnitude scale ( $M_s$ ) for very old earthquakes. The present list is not exhaustive and reliable and precise magnitude data is scarce for earthquakes that occurred prior to the development of modern measuring instruments.

*This list is incomplete; you can help by expanding it  
([http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?  
title=List\\_of\\_earthquakes\\_in\\_Japan&action=edit](http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=List_of_earthquakes_in_Japan&action=edit)).*

~BC 200 Year  
Yayoi Earthquake

| Date <span>☐</span> | Magnitude <span>☐</span>   | Name of quake                      | Japanese name | Rōmaj          |
|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------------------------|---------------|----------------|
| November 29, 684    | 8.0–8.4<br>(unknown scale) | Hakuko Nankai earthquake           | 白鳳南海地震        | Hakuko Nankai  |
| June 5, 745         | 7.9 $M_s$                  | occurred at Minoh                  |               |                |
| <b>July13, 869</b>  | 8.3 M                      | 869 Sanriku earthquake and tsunami | 貞観三陸地震        | Jōgan s jishin |

# 56th Emperor Seiwa

Present Emperor is 125th.

All victims by the Tsunami have no responsibilities.

I have all responsibility because the god punished my activities as the emperor.

Do not take any tax from these areas attacked by the tsunami.

I will pray at Ise Temple and the officers should go there and help all victims.

Clean up the mass of rubble.



858~876 as Emperor

Jorkan Earthquake and Tsunami attacked the same area in 869.

# Summary of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS

| Items                              | Unit 1       | Unit 2       | Unit 3       | Unit 4           | Unit 5           | Unit 6                   |
|------------------------------------|--------------|--------------|--------------|------------------|------------------|--------------------------|
| BWR type                           | BWR-3        | BWR-4        | BWR-4        | BWR-4            | BWR-4            | BWR-5                    |
| PCV Model                          | Mark-1       | Mark-1       | Mark-1       | Mark-1           | Mark-1           | Mark-2                   |
| Electric Output (MW <sub>e</sub> ) | 460          | 784          | 784          | 784              | 784              | 1100                     |
| Max. pressure of RPV               | 8.24MPa      | 8.24MPa      | 8.24MPa      | 8.24MPa          | 8.62MPa          | 8.62MPa                  |
| Max. Temp of the RPV               | 300°C        | 300°C        | 300°C        | 300°C            | 302°C            | 302°C                    |
| Max. Pressure of the CV            | 0.43MPa      | 0.38MPa      | 0.38MPa      | 0.38MPa          | 0.38MPa          | 0.28MPa                  |
| Max. Temp of the CV                | 140°C        | 140°C        | 140°C        | 140°C            | 138°C            | 171°C(D/W)<br>105°C(S/C) |
| Commercial Operation               | 1971,3       | 1974,7       | 1976,3       | 1978,10          | 1978,4           | 1979,10                  |
| Number of DG                       | 2            | 2 *          | 2            | 2 *              | 2                | 3*                       |
| Electric Grid                      | 275kV x 4    |              |              |                  | 500kV x 2        |                          |
| Plant Status on Mar. 11            | In Operation | In Operation | In Operation | Refueling Outage | Refueling Outage | Refueling Outage         |

\* One Emergency DG is Air-Cooled

Source: Application document of license for establishment of NPS

# Collapsed Tower


- **Damage of external power supply systems of the Fukushima Dai-ichi and Dai-ni NPSs**



# Tsunami getting over seawall



# Satellite view of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS



Many structures facing the bay are destroyed




# Damage of reactor buildings



Unit 3



Unit 1



Unit 4



### 3. Memorial International Security Exhibition and Seminar on Sep 11 in 2012 at Philadelphia

# A lot of people gathered there

- There were 20,000 people gathered for the security exhibition and 2,500 people for the security seminar at Philadelphia Convention Center.
- Dr ElBaradei, Nobel Peace Prize Winner and I made the presentations on Sept 11th.

# ElBaradei Calls for Global Dialogue

- One of the most important elements of maintaining any close relationship is **healthy, open communication**.
- If you want **Iran** to change their behavior, then you better talk to them and the **Islamic world**.
- Addressing the root of the problem would be finding out if and **why Iran** would feel like it would need **nuclear weapons in the first place**.
- **US and Russia have 19,000 nuclear weapons which can break the world 10 times. Crazy!**



The background of the slide is a photograph of Mount Fuji, a large snow-capped mountain, silhouetted against a bright orange and yellow sunset sky. The sun is low on the horizon, creating a strong lens flare effect that radiates across the upper half of the image. The water in the foreground is dark and reflects the colors of the sky and the mountain.

# Lessons Learned from Fukushima

58th ASIS International Symposium  
Pennsylvania Convention Center  
September 11, 2012

IAEA, OECD/NEA ISOE Committee 7th Chairman  
Severe Accident Management (SAM) Chairman  
Wataru MIZUMACHI


## 4. Recent Situation of Fukushima

# Current status of Fukushima NPPs

- **Reactors**: A condition equivalent to **Cold Shutdown**
  - ☐ **Temperature of RPV bottom** is, in general, **below 100°C**.
  - ☐ Release of radioactive materials from PCV is under control and **public radiation exposure** by additional release is being **significantly held down**.  
(Not exceed **1 mSv/y at the site boundary as a target**.)
  - ☐ Mid-term Safety of Circulating Water Injection Cooling System
- **Spent Fuel Pools**: More stable cooling
  - ☐ **Circulating Cooling System** by installation of **heat exchanger**
- **Radioactive Contaminated Water**: Reduction of total amount
  - ☐ Full-fledged processing facilities
  - ☐ Desalination processing (reuse)
  - ☐ Storage
  - ☐ Mitigation of contamination in the ocean



# Current Status of Fukushima Dai-ichi NPP



Unit 1



TEPCO

Unit 2



Ministry of Defense

Unit 3



Air Photo Service

Unit 4




Air Photo Service

|   |   |   |   |                             |
|---|---|---|---|-----------------------------|
| <b>Reactor Pressure vessel</b><br>Temperature at reactor vessel bottom* | Circulating water injection cooling<br>24.3°C | Circulating water injection cooling<br>47.1°C | Circulating water injection cooling<br>51.4°C | No fuel                     |
| <b>Primary Containment vessel</b><br>Temperature of air in PCV*         | Nitrogen injection<br>25.4°C                  | Nitrogen injection<br>54.3°C                  | Nitrogen injection<br>44.4°C                  | —                           |
| <b>Fuel pool</b><br>Temperature of pool water*                          | Circulation cooling<br>26.5°C                 | Circulation cooling<br>14.2°C                 | Circulation cooling<br>14.4°C                 | Circulation cooling<br>26°C |
| <b>Highly-contaminated water in R/B and T/B**</b>                       | 14,100 m <sup>3</sup>                         | 22,000m <sup>3</sup>                          | 23,800 m <sup>3</sup>                         | 18,300 m <sup>3</sup>       |

As of Feb 21, 2012

RPV Bottom Temperatures



ANN  
NEWS


2号機

格納容器




## Release Rate of Radioactive Materials from PCVs of Units 1-3

- Current total release rate of Cesium 134 and 137 from PCVs of Units 1-3 is estimated to be approx. 0.01 billion Bq/h at the maximum. (1/77,000,000 of early stages of the accident)




# Construction of Water Shielding Wall

- A measure to prevent contamination of the ocean via the underground water.



## Start of Marine Soil Covering Construction at Inside Port

- High contaminated radioactive materials were detected from marine soil sampled at inside of the port
- To prevent contamination of the ocean outside of the port, marine soil in front of the intake canal is planned to be covered with solidified soil.



(Source: TEPCO)




## Inside the Unit 4's Spent Fuel Pool






## Temperature of Fuel Pool




## Prepare for Fuel Removal from SFP of Unit 4

- Fuel removal are planned to be initiated in autumn 2013.
- Currently Rubble is being removed to prepare for the relevant works.
- Construction of covering structure will be initiated in spring 2013.




Building image of fuel removal cover




Cross-section diagram

(Source: TEPCO)

# Release rates of radioactive materials (Cesium) per hour from the PCVs of Units 1 to 3







Before and after the debris removal (upper: before, lower: after)




Debris storage area (Left: Containers storing debris, Right: Storage tent)




**Exposure doses in case the release rate from the PCVs of Units 1 to 3 at the time of the evaluation continues for one year (mSv/year)**

(Excluding the effect of the already released radioactive materials)





# Protected Areas



# 1F4 PCV Head Removal



1 F4 Spent Fuels Removal from  
Spent fuel Pool



1F2 Inside Reactor Building





1F3 Above Operating Floor of R/B



## **5. Future Efforts to Settle the Situation**


# Efforts to restore the Accident

Red colored: newly added to the previous version, Blue colored: modified from the previous version

| Issues         | As of April 17        | Step 1 (around 3 months)<br>current status<br>(as of June 17)  | Step 2<br>(around 3 to 6 months after achieving Step 1)   | Mid-term issues  |
|----------------|-----------------------|--|---|--|
| I. Cooling     | (1) Reactor           | Fresh water Injection<br>Cooling by minimum injection rate (injection cooling)<br>Consideration and preparation of reuse of accumulated water<br>Nitrogen gas injection<br>Consideration and implementation of sealing measure at leaking points of PCV<br>Improvement of work environment | Stable cooling<br>Circulating Injection Cooling (start)<br>Cold shutdown condition<br>PCV flooding<br>Securing heat exchange function   | Protection against corrosion cracking of structural materials<br>*to be partially implemented ahead of schedule  |
|                | (2) Spent Fuel Pool   | Fresh water injection<br>Reliability improvement in injection operation /remote-control operation *ahead of schedule<br>Circulation cooling system (installation of heat exchanger) *partially ahead of schedule   | Stable cooling<br>Remote-controlled injection operation<br>Consideration / installation of heat exchanging function<br>More stable cooling  | Removal of fuels   |
| II. Mitigation | (3) Accumulated Water | Transferring water with high radiation level<br>Storing water with low radiation level<br>Installation of storage / processing facilities<br>Installation of storage facilities / decontamination processing   | Secure storage place<br>Expansion of storage / processing facilities<br>Decontamination / Desalt processing (reuse), etc<br>Storage / management of sludge waste etc.<br>Mitigation of contamination in the ocean | Reduction of total amount of contaminated water<br>Installation of full-fledged water processing facilities<br>Completion of processing of accumulated water in buildings<br>Processing of sludge waste etc.<br>Mitigation of contamination in the ocean (continued) |
|                | (4) Ground water      | Mitigation of contamination of groundwater   | Mitigate ocean contamination (continued)<br>(Sub-drainage management with expansion of storage / processing facilities)<br>Consideration of shielding wall of groundwater   | Solidification of contaminated soil, etc<br>Establishment of shielding wall of groundwater   |
|                | (5) Atmosphere / Soil | Dispersion of inhibitor<br>Removal of debris   | Mitigate scattering (continued)<br>Installing reactor building cover (with ventilation system)<br>Consideration of reactor building container   | Installation of reactor building container   |
|                |                       |  |   |  |

# Overview of Major Countermeasures in the Power Station as of June 17

Red colored: newly added to the previous version





# Main points of Roadmap

| Issues         |                   | Main points   |
|----------------|-------------------|---|
| I. Cooling     | Reactor           | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Nitrogen gas injection (Step I)</li> <li>• Circulation cooling system in which contaminated water accumulated in buildings is reused for reactor cooling (Step I, II)</li> </ul> |
|                | Spent fuel pool   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Circulation cooling system (Step I)</li> </ul>   |
| II. Mitigation | Accumulated water | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Installation of storage/processing facilities (Step I)</li> </ul>  |
|                | Ground water      | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Mitigation of contaminated ground water (Step I, II)</li> </ul>  |
|                | Atmosphere /Soil  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Dispersion of inhibitor (Step I, II)</li> <li>• Removal of debris (Step I, II)</li> </ul>  |

## **6. Responses at Other Nuclear Power Stations**



# Responses at other Nuclear Power Stations

## 1. Emergency Safety Measures

- NISA instructed all electric power companies to implement emergency safety measures. (30 March)
- Based on the report from each electric utilities, NISA has confirmed that emergency safety measures had been appropriately implemented. (6 May)

## 2. Additional Emergency Safety Measures

- NISA and other relevant ministries are to improve and strengthen the emergency safety measures based on lessons learned from the accidents which are stated in the Government report to IAEA. (7 June)

## 3. Hamaoka NPS shutdown

- The government requested Chubu Electric Power Company to halt the operation of all units of Hamaoka NPS due to high possibility of large-scale tsunami resulting from the envisioned earthquake. (6 May)


## 4. Stress test

- The government announced to hold the stress test on NPPs. (6 July)

# Outline of Emergency Safety Measures


| Phase                             | Emergency Safety Measures  |   |
|-----------------------------------|--|---|
|                                   | Short Term   | Mid Term  |
| Expected Time to Completion       | Done   | One to three years  |
| Goals<br>(Desired Level / Extent) | <p>Preventing fuel damage and spent fuel damage even if</p> <p>(1)AC power supplies,<br/>(2)seawater cooling functions and<br/>(3)spent-fuel storage pool cooling functions are all lost.</p>  | <p>Enhancing reliability of emergency safety measures (short term)<br/>(Securing/speeding up achievement of cold shutdown; measures against tsunami)</p>  |
| Examples of Specific Measures     | <p>【Securing Equipment】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Deploying power generator vehicles (to support cooling reactors and spent fuel pools)</li> <li>● Deploying fire engines (to supply cooling water)</li> <li>● Deploying fire hoses (to secure water supply routes from freshwater tanks, seawater pits, etc.)</li> </ul> <p>【Preparing Procedural Manuals, Etc.】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Preparing procedural manuals for emergency responses utilizing the above-mentioned equipment</li> </ul> <p>【Training to Respond】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Implementing training for emergency responses based on the procedural manuals</li> </ul> <p>【Measures Against Flooding】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Measures to prevent flooding at reactor buildings assuming approx. 15-meter-high tsunami</li> </ul> | <p>【Measures Against Assumed approx.15-Meter Tsunami】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Building seawalls</li> <li>● Installing water-tight doors</li> </ul> <p>【Measures to Secure/Speed Up Achievement of Cold Shutdown】</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>● Installation of air-cooled diesel power generators</li> <li>● Securing back-up electric motors for seawater pumps</li> <li>● Actions needed for other necessary equipment</li> </ul> |

# Series of Events and Countermeasures in case of tsunami, for BWR




# Series of Events and Countermeasures in case of tsunami, for PWR


(1) Loss of External Power Supply




(2) & (5) Water supply / cooling of steam generator, supply water to condensate tank




(3) & (4) Injection of Boric Acid Water from Pressure Accumulator tank, shut-off of the valve



(6) Connection of Power Supply Car



(7) Water Injection to Spent Fuel Pit



# **7. Nuclear Renaissance After Fukushima**

# Nuclear Renaissance After Fukushima

- Withdrawal from Nuke

Germany by 2022

Spain, Switzerland Gradually

- Delay of New Construction

USA, France, (Japan : Chaos)

- Promotion of New Construction

China, Korea, India, Russia, Finland, UAE

- New Comer to Nuke

Vietnam, Indonesia, Turkey, Poland, Jordan,  
Saudi-Arabia, Belarus

China


Nuke Ratio : From 1. 8%

to 4%

As of 2012

15 NPPs : Operating

27 NPPS :Under Construction



**運転中 6サイト・11基 8,998MWe**

秦山I : 1号機 (PWR 310MWe)  
秦山II : 1, 2号機 (PWR 各650MWe)  
秦山III : 1, 2号機 (CANDU 各720MWe)  
大亜湾 : 1, 2号機 (PWR 各984MWe)  
嶺澳I : 1, 2号機 (PWR 各990MWe)  
田湾I : 1, 2号機 (VVER-1000 各1,000MWe)

**建設中 3サイト・8基 7,300MWe**

秦山II : 3, 4号機 (PWR 各650MWe)  
嶺澳II : 1, 2号機 (PWR 各1,000MWe)  
紅沿河 : 1~4号機 (PWR 各1,000MWe)

**建設開始確定 4サイト・10基 10,320MWe**

陽江 : CPR1000 1,080MWe 4基  
三門 : AP-1000 1,000MWe 2基  
海陽 : AP-1000 1,000MWe 2基  
寧徳 : PWR 1,000MWe 2基

**今後建設可能性が高いプロジェクト 13サイト**

**建設可能性はあるが未だ検討中のプロジェクト 12サイト**

**建設提案あるも建設可能性が低いプロジェクト 11サイト**





**Dubai 14 NPPs are planned by 2022 (\$ 100 Billion)**



**Dubai  
Tower  
828m  
Hotel,  
Mansion  
Office  
Dubai**

**7 Star Hotel on the Island(321m)**

## 8.New Regulatory Body

# NRA (Nuclear Regulation Authority) started Sept 19 last week

- Prime Minister instead of Japan's Parliament assigned **5 commissioners**.
- Mr. Tanaka, First Chairman said
  1. NRA will **revise nuclear safety guide** within this year **including the severe accident management and countermeasure** which was not included in the current one.
  2. **Early next year** they will check all NPSs by the new one **for the restart**.
- Annual Budget is 630 Million Dollar
- Man Power : 480

# Structure and functions of the NRA

For administrative purpose, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) is placed under the Ministry of the Environment (MOE). However, independent personnel control from MOE is secured. In the future independent budget will be secured.

NRA consists of :

- Commission

One chairman and 4 commissioners are appointed by the Prime Minister after the approval of the National Parliament.


- Secretariat

The NRA has a comprehensive function of nuclear regulation.

- Nuclear Safety (from METI, MEXT and MLIT)
- Nuclear Security (from METI, MEXT and AEC)
- Nuclear Safeguards (from MEXT)
- Radiation Monitoring (from MEXT)
- Radioisotopes Regulation (from MEXT)

**Independence:** Separate nuclear regulation function and nuclear promotion function and establish the “Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA)”, as an independent commission body affiliated to the MOE. Chairman and Commissioners are appointed by the Prime Minister after the approval of the National Diet.

**Integration:** Integrate nuclear regulation functions, namely, nuclear safety, security, safeguards, radiation monitoring and radioisotopes regulation, into the NRA.





## 9. Conclusion on Nuclear Renaissance


1. Before Fukushima accident, 438 new NPSs will be expected to start operation by 2025.
2. After Fukushima, Germany, Italy, Switzerland, Spain will quit the new construction of NPSs.
3. USA and Japan will delay the new construction.
4. China, Korea, India, Finland, and the new countries like Vietnam and UAE will continue to construct NPSs.
5. For these countries, we have to improve the safety by lessons learned from Fukushima.

# Conclusion on Fukushima Accident

1. There exist a lot of the high radioactive materials in the Nuclear Power Plants and we should not release these to the public.
2. Fukushima made the bad human and organizational mistakes.
3. We have to remember the basic safety philosophy of the nuke.
4. Although the severely strong earthquake attacked Fukushima, the plant was safely stopped and cooled the core and kept all radioactive materials inside.
5. Tsunami damaged everything.

# Conclusion on Fukushima Accident (No 2)

6. There are two major mistakes in Fukushima. One is the organizational issue. IAEA clearly stated that the complicated structures and organizations can result in delay in urgent decision making. We have to learn from Security Society.
7. Second one is the hardware. In the case of severe accident, the water , the electricity and the instrumentation are essential.
8. In the world, all utilities formed the new organizations for the severe accident and they have already added the core supply water, other electricity and so on ,and the safety grade of the all nuclear power plants improved so much.



We learned a lot from Fukushima. We have to operate the nuclear power plants safely to supply the good quality, large scale, economical, clean electricity to the public in the world.



*Thank you for your attention*

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